The Friedlander Peace Plan: An Evenhanded Policy for Peace

Toward an Evenhanded Policy for Peace in the Holy Land, Part 3

By Professor Alan Friedlander

In the creation of the Friedlander Peace Plan, an effort has been made to try to form a peace plan for an electorate that currently votes for terrorists, the Palestinians, and for a nation that is adamant about keeping its current ethnic mix, the Israelis. There is a general lack of trust because Palestinians and Israelis are fighting over the same territory. If seen from a perspective of victor and loser, which is the natural baggage that comes as an intrinsic aspect of territorial disputes, then only one side can truly win and the other side therefore must lose. This makes compromise politically impossible without creating a loser, or two vaguely confused combatants with so many minor wins and losses along the way that the meaning of the victory is run away in the downpour of endless compromise, leaving only the taste of defeat in the mouths of both sides. In other words, any two-state solution based peace deal is guaranteed to dissatisfy at least one side and probably both. In other words, any two-state solution peace initiative is guaranteed to be a temporary solution until the next conflict arises.

Meanwhile, all other one state solutions believe in shipping one nation or the other to another country, tearing asunder civil rights such as the right to reside in one's own property and the right to vote, thus also creating dissatisfaction on both a societal as well as a national scale. Therefore any true peace deal must minimize feelings of dissatisfaction that are caused by any one side "losing" the negotiations, and also any peace deal must be able to create a permanent solution, otherwise all gains will eventually be lost and the cycle of violence would not cease, God forbid.

By naturalizing West Bank and Gaza Arabs, but in a corresponding ratio based system to Jewish immigration, both key individual national desires of full political rights for Palestinians in the territories and an end to security risks for Israelis will be met. Both sides would also benefit from peace without withdrawal, which makes no political losers on a national scale, plus the right in many cases to keep a family homestead that has existed for dozens and dozens of years, no losers on a societal scale. The newly united State of Israel would experience a massive investment surge from overseas companies and industries, the likes of which have never been seen in the country before.

Anticipating and tracking any change in the status quo of the rate of immigration is crucial to keep this peace deal fair. First the electorate must set the ratio. If currently there are more than 5 Jews for every Arab. So would 2 Arabs admitted to the State of Israel for every 10 Jews admitted be what the electorate would choose? Whatever the numbers, and I am not in a position right now to make any solid suggestions on what the will of the people should be or is in this regard, nevertheless I feel that the ratio should not necessarily be considered written in stone. Through the wise fluctuation of the ratio rate of immigration and naturalization on a sliding scale in favor of the "disadvantaged" population it is possible to avoid major potential causes for flare ups in the future. It is certain that a ratio too extreme in either direction would be a costly mistake for which there is no need to extrapolate.

If I am ever quoted on this, allow me to point out that I never said terrorists should be granted citizenship. No country would make a citizen out of wanton felons, let alone murderers. But also that Palestinians have clearly been reacting to a series of Israeli and Western leaders supporting terrorists in diplomatic clothing such as Abbas. Such Palestinian leaders are PLO terrorists, not true moderates. Therefore peace negotiations in the past have taken unfair turns. All because the stand President Bush took against Hamas' take over in Gaza, was how pseudo moderates like Abbas should have been dealt with as well. It was the Western support of Arafat and Abbas that created the group psychological phenomena that propelled terror into the sphere of political option in the minds of Palestinian voters. Only by having zero tolerance toward fake diplomats such as Abbas can then the rise of true moderate, third way candidates be seen amongst the Palestinians and become widely acceptable to the public. This is an essential step in the local self governance that is necessary in primarily Palestinian Arab populated regions in the West Bank and Gaza, in order to allow Palestinian towns to be added one by one to the body of the State of Israel.

It should be clearly understood that all other peace deals have been begun by taking the first step with the wrong foot. The beginning of peace does not come by the placation of terror; that is its anathema. If your goal is trying to keep people from dying or losing their homes, then please let these words that I have told you take on meaning in your heart.

What do I answer to those who say, well what if in the end it turns out that most Palestinians utterly and eternally reject peace in support of terror. Will all this effort have all been in vain? To them I say: What of the flowers among the thorns? What of the innocent ones among them? Abraham, the forefather of Jews and Arabs prayed for those innocent trapped among the guilty. It's time that Abraham's descendants on both sides showed more respect for his legacy, and this most sacred family tradition.

A Discussion on the Mechanics of the Naturalization of West Bank and Gaza Arabs to the State of Israel

Toward an Evenhanded Policy for Peace in the Holy Land, Part 2:

A Discussion on the Mechanics of the Naturalization of West Bank and Gaza Arabs to the State of Israel

By Professor Alan Friedlander

In regard to this policy of Arabic absorption upon which the Friedlander version of the One State Solution depends... Obviously, and even Arab Israelis would agree that you cannot allow entry into the State of Israel and grant the right to vote to terrorists with blood on their hands or those who support terror. This then brings us back to the concern we raised before that, according to that March 19, 2008 NY Times poll, now a majority of West Bank Palestinian Arabs support terror against Israel. So how is it possible for a significant enough number of Palestinians in the territories to be eligible to become naturalized Israelis even in the eyes of their own Arab cousins in Israel?

Again, the good part of bureaucracy comes to the rescue. To best illustrate first we need to categorize the intensity of the problem, and next we prioritize the organization of the Arabic naturalization rate according to a Score of the Level-Of-Probable-Innocence (L.O.P.I. Score, to coin a phrase) of each immigration applicant. The higher the L.O.P.I. Score rating, the better chance they have to become an Israeli.

Categorization:

1. Terrorists with blood on their hands or their sponsors are the worst and are ineligible to become Israelis by any standard. They are inhuman.
2. Terrorists without blood on their hands are only slightly better. They look forward to murdering someone.
3. Avid supporters of terror who curse the existence of the State of Israel. Their hatred is deep.
4. Supporters of terror who are only doing so out of frustration and would likely stop if the frustration stopped.
5. Supporter of terror for political reasons. In the sick, Pro-Hamas culture, if you support terror, then your stock goes up in the eyes of the government. We have seen this in history in the cultures of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. It may mean more food on their tables each week.
6. Those courageous Palestinian Arabs who stand up to peer pressure and reject any connection whatsoever with terrorism, even though they are ostracized by their own neighbors.

A L.O.P.I. Score of 3 or less means they are ineligible to become Israeli citizens. Level 4 supporters may end up being rejected by both Jewish and Arab Israelis as being potential immigrants, but perhaps not. Level 5 would get some opposition from the political right, but certainly less than level 4. I would think most would agree that level 6 Arab applicants are a highly desirable crop of potential immigrants.

How to determine the difference between a level 5 and a level three terror supporter? For some in these categories it could be as simple as asking them to pledge support of Israel and foreswear terror as a legitimate form of civil disobedience in the world. Those close to terror may not be able to take such a citizenship pledge, while for those far from terror in their hearts it may be very easy for them to take such a pledge.

For those in between categories; the externally indefinable citizenship applicants, how do we determine their true colors? One would need to know certain classified security secrets that I currently have neither access to, nor do I desire access to, that only Israel and the United States governments are privy to, in order to be able to offer any form of coherent and specified advice. Suffice it to say that the advice of King David from Psalm 131 holds true here, concerning not venturing too deeply into matters greater or more complex than one’s expertise. But fear not, there are those who could answer this query already in place in our governments. The major question is whether this query ever gets asked as a matter of actual policy. Let’s hope the answer is positive.

Prioritization:

Very simply, a L.O.P.I. Score of 6 or something very close to that equals being accepted as soon as a corresponding amount of Jewish immigrants come to Israel as well.

What to do with those who are terrorists? Bring them to justice. The others whom all Israelis, Jew, Arab, all groups alike collectively reject, those rejects who pose no active danger to the State, yet reject the idea of joining the State civilly, should not be kept in a segregated camp in perpetuity, but be given provisions and financial compensation and sent on their way (out of the country), in the spirit of pardoning sinners as on the Biblical Jubilee. This should be done with as much compassion as possible, all according to the nature of the crimes and the will of the people at the time such an event would occur.

But in all these matters I do not pretend that a professor sitting in New York City can judge what is best for Israelis better than they can themselves. This is a matter for Israelis, Jews, Arabs, Bedouins and everyone else in the State of Israel, to decide. This Professor is merely offering examples based upon a theoretical model of another way to go on the path to end violence as swiftly and perpetually as possible, toward a truly just and lasting peace; may God grant it speedily and in our days. Amen.